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ABSTRACT
Family systems form the basis of society and correlate with distinct socio-economic structures. In nuclear families, children
build families of their own after marriage, whereas in extended families, children stay at the parents’ home. The inheritance of
wealth among siblings is whether equal or unequal. These two dichotomies shape the four basic family systems. However,
their origin remains unknown. In this study, we theoretically simulated a model of preindustrial peasant societies consisting
of families. By introducing family-level and society-level competition for their growth, we demonstrated that the four family
systems emerge depending on environmental conditions characterizing the land scarcity and the external perturbations that
damage society. The commencement of agriculture and the area location explain the geographical distribution of family systems
across the world. Analyses on the wealth distribution among families demonstrate the connection between family systems and
socio-economic structures quantitatively. This connection explains the development of distinct modern ideologies.
Family systems provide the basis of a social structure, in-
cluding its sociological, ideological, and economic character-
istics1–3. Generally, family systems are based on parent-child
and inter-sibling relationships. A parent-child relationship
refers to children whether living together at their parents’
home, which is termed an extended family, or building homes
of their own, which is termed a nuclear family. An inter-
sibling relationship refers to siblings whether being equal or
unequal, especially in the distribution of inheritance. These
characteristics last in area over a long period and have at-
tracted significant attention in the study of history4–6, histori-
cal demography7, and anthropology1, 2, 8, among others.
Family systems are broadly classified into the four types1, 2.
(1) Absolute nuclear families, which are nuclear families with
unequal inheritance, are dominant in England and the Nether-
lands. (2) Egalitarian nuclear families, which are nuclear
families with equal inheritance, are dominant in France (es-
pecially in Paris) and central Spain. (3) Stem families, which
are extended families with unequal inheritance, are dominant
in Japan and Germany. (4) Community families, which are
extended families with equal inheritance, are dominant in
China, Russia, and Northern India. Links exist between each
of these family systems and modern social ideologies. Liberal-
ism, liberal egalitarianism, social democracy, and communism
are dominant in the regions with absolute nuclear, egalitarian
nuclear, stem, and community families, respectively1, 2. A
more detailed classification has been presented based on pa-
ternal/maternal inheritance and the external/internal marriage
rule8. However, in this study, we ignore such details and focus
only on the conditions under which each of the four family
systems mentioned above emerges and the socio-economic
structure that corresponds to each.
Isolated and self-sufficient peasant societies prevailed in
the preindustrial world9–12 and provided a basis for modern
political systems1. Family system determines residence and
inheritance patterns in land usage1, 8. Children may cultivate
lands of their own or work together on their parents’ land.
One heir may inherit the land and most of the property, and
the other children inherit only a little13, 14 or the land and the
property may be divided equally among family members14.
It is unclear why various family systems exist in different ar-
eas. Researchers have tried to explain the appearance of each
system as a result of cultural transmission and the adaptation
to environmental conditions, such as land scarcity, farmland
management system, and frequency of famine among oth-
ers8, 15, 16. However, the argument requires further scrutiny.
The discussion regarding the relationship between family sys-
tems and ideologies remains largely psychoanalytical2. Theo-
retical studies for unveiling the conditions under which each
family system evolves, and for connecting family systems
with socio-economic structures need to be conducted. In such
studies, mathematical modelling would be relevant17. Theo-
retical studies to date have involved modelling the influence
of demographic condition and marriage rule on household
size18 or the spatial pattern of paternal/maternal inheritance19.
We adopt a framework involving multi-level selection for a
hierarchical system. We note that families constitute society,
whereas society provides the environment for families. The
multi-level selection was originally introduced to explain the
evolution of cooperative behaviour among eusocial insects
by examining the conflict between the fitness of an individ-
ual and that of a group20, 21. This framework is generally
applied to the evolution of hierarchical systems and is used to
discuss the public good or social structure in biological and
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Fig. 1. Schematic of the model. a, The multi-level evolutionary
process. Societies (green) consist of families (blue) in which family
members (black) live together. The grey frame represents a single
generation. When the population of a society reaches twice the
initial population, a society splits and another society is removed
from the system at random to keep the number of societies fixed
— i.e., we adopt the hierarchical Moran process. b, The separation
strategy of the family and the life cycle. Black squares, circles, and
triangles represent members of different generations. The size of the
blue circle reflects the amount of wealth that each family possesses.
Dashed arrows show the separation of siblings and arrows show
the production of wealth through family labour. Each family has
a separation strategy s. With the probability of s, siblings produce
together, after which they become independent and reproduce the
next generation, as in an extended family. With the probability of
1− s, siblings are separated, after which they produce independently
and reproduce the next generation, as in a nuclear family.
social evolution22–27. We have previously applied the frame-
work to construct a mathematical model for the evolution of
kinship structures in clan societies22. Diverse kinship struc-
tures emerge depending only on the environmental parameters
that characterize the degree of cooperation and competition
resulting from marriage.
In this study, we investigate the evolution of family systems
and social structures by introducing an agent-based multi-
level evolutionary model of preindustrial peasant societies.
Competition is considered in two levels: that of family, which
is the individual agent of the model, and society, which is a
group of families. Families produce wealth through family
labour and reproduce. They possess two strategy parameters
concerning the time children leave their parents’ home and the
distribution of inheritance among them, which are transmitted
with slight mutations in each generation. Evolutionary simula-
tions show that the four family systems emerge depending on
environmental parameters that characterize the land scarcity
and the external perturbations that damage society. We then
describe the characteristics of social structure in terms of the
distribution of wealth in society and relate them to family
systems.
Results
Evolution of Family Systems
A schematic representation of the model is shown in Fig.
1a,b. Society consists of families. In each family, individual
members live and work together. Children build families of
their own by inheriting their parents’ wealth. Wealth w is
accumulated through production, which in turn increases the
level of production and the population by taking demographic
reports into account7. Each society splits into two when the
number of families therein doubles its initial value N f , and
each family is randomly assigned to one of the two daughter
societies. At this time, another society is removed at random
so that the number of societies in the entire system remains
fixed to Ns. Therefore, societies that grow faster replace
others, resulting in the society-level selection. This multi-level
selection of families and societies follows the hierarchical
Moran process22–24.
Capacity c×N f , which represents the amount of available
land resources in a society, and ε , which is the loss of wealth
at the time children build families of their own for surviving
external threats are given as environmental parameters. If the
wealth w at that moment is less than ε , the child dies without
reproducing.
Families have population and wealth, as well as two strategy
parameters: λ , which represents the parameter characterizing
the inequality in the inheritance of wealth among siblings,
and s, which represents the probability of children staying at
their parents’ home to produce together. The mth child’s share
of the inheritance is proportional to exp(−λm). Therefore,
λ = 0 represents an equal division of inheritance, whereas a
larger λ represents the first child inheriting more.
The life cycle of the families depends on the separation
strategy s. With the probability of 1− s, siblings are sepa-
rated, i.e., inherit some property determined by λ , lose ε of
wealth, and build families of their own to produce indepen-
dently. In contrast, with a probability of s, siblings remain in
their parents’ family to produce together, after which they are
separated. According to the law of diminishing return, pro-
ductivity increases sub-linearly with labour force input28–30.
Thus, the total output of siblings is always higher when each
produces independently to form a nuclear family than when
they concentrate their labour in an extended family. Under
a limited capacity of available land resources, however, the
total output of the society consisting of nuclear families will
be lower than that of extended families because of the in-
efficiency in land usage. In other words, there is a conflict
between society and family levels. A nuclear family is an
advantageous strategy at the individual family level. However,
an extended family is advantageous at the society level, under
conditions of limited capacity.
After sibling separation and the production of wealth, each
family reproduces. The number of children in families follows
the Poisson distribution with a mean of b+ f w, where b and
f represent the minimal birth rate and the feedback ratio, re-
spectively. s and λ are culturally transmitted over generations,
with a slight variation through “mutation”31, 32 with the rate
of µ . At the time of altering generations, each society splits if
the number of families reaches 2N f . See Methods for details.
Simulations are performed for 2,000 time steps by changing
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Fig. 2. Time series of family strategy parameters. The temporal
evolution of the values of s and λ of families in a society are plotted
in red and blue, respectively, for environmental conditions with
ε = 0.0001,0.01 and c= 0.7,3.
the parameter values shown in Table 1. The time series of the
evolution of family strategy parameters are shown in Fig. 2.
Family strategies do not diverge within each society, but are
concentrated around a specific value adapted to each given
environmental condition. The separation strategy s (plotted in
red) and the inheritance strategy λ (plotted in blue) evolve de-
pending on the values of c and ε , respectively. The evolution
of the strategy converges within approximately 1,000 steps in
every parameter region.
We conducted multi-level evolutionary simulation 100
times for each condition and averaged the strategy param-
eters of families in the last 1,000 steps. Fig. 3a,b shows the
dependence of s and λ upon c and ε . When ε is small or
large, that is when the wealth required for survival is small or
large, inequality or equality in the inheritance among siblings
evolves, respectively. When c is small or large, that is when
there is limited or sufficient room for cultivation, extended
or nuclear families evolve, respectively. Fig. 3c shows the
phase diagram of family systems. Here, we classify the family
systems as extended if s≥ 0.5 and as nuclear if s< 0.5. Simi-
Table 1. Parameters used in the model. ∗ represents the variables
varied in Fig. 4. ∗∗ represents the variables varied in Fig. S1.
Symbol Explanation Value
b Minimal birth rate 1.5∗
f Feedback rate from wealth to birth rate 0.3∗∗
d Decay rate of wealth 0.5∗∗
N f Initial number of families in a society 30∗
Ns Number of societies in a system 50∗
µ Mutation rate for s and λ 0.03∗∗
c Ratio of capacity and N f Variable
ε Loss of wealth for independence Variable
σ Strength of the noise in productivity 0.1
a b c
Fig. 3. Dependence of family strategy parameters upon environ-
mental parameter values. The graphs show the average values of
λ (a) and s (b) for families in the last 1,000 steps of simulation. c,
The phase diagram of family systems. Stem, community, absolute
nuclear, and egalitarian nuclear families are plotted in green, red,
blue, and orange, respectively. Separation strategies are classified
as those of an extended family if s≥ 0.5 and as those of a nuclear
family if s< 0.5. Inheritance strategies are classified as unequal if
λ ≥ log2 and as equal if λ < log2.
larly, we classify them as unequal inheritance if λ ≥ log2 and
as equal if λ < log2. This criterion is given by whether the
share of the inheritance by the subsequent children is smaller
than half of that by the preceding children. Therefore, the four
basic family systems evolve depending on the two environ-
mental parameters c and ε . A stem family (plotted in green)
evolves if c and ε are small. A community family (plotted in
red) evolves if c is small and ε is large. An absolute nuclear
family (plotted in blue) evolves if c is large and ε is small,
and an egalitarian nuclear family (plotted in orange) evolves
if both c and ε are large.
We show the dependence of the phase diagrams of family
systems upon other parameters in Fig. 4 and Fig. S1. Phase
diagrams plotted against c and ε are qualitatively robust and
independent of the other parameter values. However, quan-
titative trends exist. Generally, dependence on Ns and N f
show the effect of multi-level selection22–24. For large N f or
small Ns (ultimately, if Ns = 1), the family-level competition
becomes dominant rather than that of society-level. There-
fore, the benefit of society becomes less important, and selfish
behaviour evolves. Conversely, when the society-level compe-
tition is dominant because of small N f or large Ns, cooperative
behaviour evolves as a result of society-level selection. Fig.
4a,b shows that if N f is large or Ns is small, nuclear families
evolve even when c is small. Recall that the total production
of siblings increases if they work independently, but that of
society decreases because of the inefficiency in land usage if
the capacity is limited. Therefore, choosing a nuclear family
is a selfish strategy that evolves for small Ns and large N f .
When Ns = 1, the society-level fitness is not considered so
that the nuclear family evolves in most parameter regions.
As wealth is initially accumulated, ε would be relatively
small for w and accumulation would be accelerated. However,
when the minimal birth rate b is high, the number of offspring
increases, and each share decreases. Therefore, less wealth is
accumulated, and equal distribution evolves in larger parame-
ter regions because of relatively large ε , as shown in Fig. 4c.
Dependence of the phase diagram on the parameters µ,d, and
f are shown in Fig. S1.
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Fig. 4. Dependence of the phase diagrams of family systems on
parameters with ∗ in Table 1 (a, Ns b, N f c, b). Unless the value is
shown on the axis, the parameter values are fixed to those in Table 1.
Wealth Distribution and Evolution of Social Struc-
ture
Subsequently, we investigated the wealth distribution of fami-
lies for each society after evolution. Note that data from the
wealth distribution of the majority (people except elites) in
modern society suggest an exponential-type tail for the rich
side, which decays slower than the normal distribution33, 34
(say a log-normal distribution35 or gamma distribution36) and
a power distribution for the poor side37 (say a gamma distri-
bution36). The gamma distribution is obtained by assuming
the growth of wealth with positive feedback and nonlinear
saturation, as well as a multiplicative stochastic process (see
Supplementary Text).
Fig. 5a shows the frequency distribution of the wealth
of families within each society. In every parameter region,
the distribution approximately follows a power-law on the
poor side and an exponential tail on the rich side, which is
consistent with recent data33–37. Here, the heaviness of tails
depends on the environmental parameters. When c and ε
are smaller, the poor and rich tail are heavier, respectively.
Because inherited wealth depends on birth order, we also
plotted the distribution of wealth by distinguishing the eldest
siblings from the others in Fig. 5b. With decreasing ε and
increasing inheritance inequality, the distribution of wealth
between siblings separates further. Increasing land scarcity
(smaller c) and the evolution of extended families result in
poorer younger siblings, whereas greater land availability
(larger c) and the evolution of nuclear families give rise to
wealthier younger siblings
We fitted the poor and rich tails of the wealth distribution us-
ing the power-law wα and exponential distribution exp(−βw),
respectively. The fitted values of α and β are averaged over
100 trials for each environmental parameter c and ε in Fig.
6a,b. The heaviness of the tail on the poor side is increased
for smaller values of c and alpha, while the heaviness of the
tail on the rich side is increased for smaller values of ε and β .
These results suggest the characteristics of the wealth distri-
bution in the four corresponding family systems. However, it
remains unclear whether they result from the environmental
conditions or family systems. To confirm the relevance of
family systems, we computed the dependence of the tails on
family systems by sampling each family system using fixed
environmental parameters c and ε near the boundary of the
four phases of family systems, where the values of s and λ
are distributed to cover all four family systems.
The average values of α,β for each family system, which
were sampled for the fixed environmental parameters, are
shown in Fig. 6c,d. They demonstrate the trend that the
poor tail is heavier for an extended family, and the rich tail is
heavier for unequal inheritance. By comparing these results
(plotted in black) with the results averaged over all environ-
mental parameters (plotted in red), it is shown that the above
trend depends on each family system and is further intensified
by environmental parameter values.
Discussion
By simulating the multi-level evolution model of family sys-
tems using the environmental parameters for the capacity of
available land resources c and the amount of wealth required
for survival ε , we demonstrated that an extended or nuclear
family evolves under small or large c, respectively, and that
unequal or equal inheritance among siblings evolves under
small or large ε , respectively. Therefore, the four basic family
systems are represented as “phases” depending on c and ε .
Additionally, we clarified the characteristics of wealth dis-
tribution determined by the dominant family systems within
societies. The tail of the poor side is heavier for extended
families and that of the rich side is heavier for families with
unequal inheritance.
From this dependence of family systems on environmental
conditions, one can discuss their geographic configuration,
as in Fig. 7. Demographics report that the death rate caused
by war, famine, and starvation, decreases in the following
order: the centre of the continent, peripheral, and island re-
gions7, 38, 39, which suggests that ε decreases in the same order.
Areas in Western Europe, particularly Spain, Italy, and France,
were frequently attacked by foreign people, such as Muslims,
Magyars, and Vikings, which resulted in a large ε therein40.
The period since the onset of agriculture gives a measure for
capacity. In areas where agriculture started early, population
growth resulted in the exhaustion of available land and labour-
intensive farming developed, as seen in China11, 41, Russia42,
and Japan43. In Western Europe, especially Holland, the Paris
Basin, Southern England, and central Spain, the capacity was
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Fig. 5. Distributions of wealth in evolved societies. a, The graphs show the frequency distribution of family wealth in the last 1,000 steps for
environmental conditions with ε = 0.0001,0.01 and c= 0.7,3. The orange line shows the power-law fitting, and the purple line shows the
exponential distribution fitting. Insets show the log-log plot of the frequency distribution. b, The wealth distribution of the eldest (red) and
the other siblings (blue).
large and labour-saving farming was developed41 as a result
of the following reasons: agricultural progress in medieval
times enabled virgin land cultivation by gathering second and
subsequent sons9, 30, 44, 45, the population stagnated because of
religious wars and plagues30, and colonies were established
early on11.
From Fig. 7 and geohistorical reports discussed above,
one can explain the family systems in each region: absolute
nuclear families in England and the Netherlands, where ε was
small and c was large; egalitarian nuclear families in France,
Spain, and Italy, where ε and c were large; stem families in
Japan, Germany and many parts of rural Western Europe46,
where ε and c were small; and community families in China,
Russia, and Northern India, where ε was large and c was
small.
Apart from these environmental conditions, the number of
families within a society N f , number of societies Ns, and birth
rate b are also relevant parameters for determining the family
system. N f is large for large-scale land management as seen
in England, the Netherlands, France, and Spain, whereas N f
is small and Ns is large in family management farms as seen
in China, Russia, Japan, and Germany. The trends in Fig.
4a,b are consistent with the observation of nuclear families
in the former regions and extended families in the latter. The
birth rate was low in Japan and Western Europe, especially in
England7, and high in Russia42. The observation of unequal
inheritance in the former regions and equal distribution in the
latter demonstrates a tendency similar to the one in Fig. 4c.
Next, we examine the validity of our results regarding the
relationships between family systems and socio-economic
structures by referring to historical studies, especially those
on Western Europe1, 12, which have rich data. Figs. 6 and 7
suggest that England and the Netherlands had large α and
small β . Indeed, wealthy farmers prospered and employed
the majority as labourers who had better living standards
than those in other regions1, 7, 11, 15, 47, 48. The accumulation
of capital and an independent labour force of the majority
explains the development of individual liberty1 and capital-
ism4–6, 11 in England. France and Spain were suggested to
have large α and β . There, people were less differentiated and
weakly stratified11, 12, 49, which allowed people to appreciate
the values of freedom and equality. Our results suggest that
Germany, Sweden, and Japan had small α and β . Wealthy
farmers prospered by exploiting peasants and the stratification
of society advanced, which resulted in the acceptance of order
and class distinctions1, 12, 43, 50–52. Russia and China were sug-
gested to have small α and large β . Indeed, the middle class is
significantly sparse and peasants were uniformly poor and sub-
ordinate12, which provided room for communism53, 54. In this
way, the wealth distribution obtained in our model connects
family systems with society-level studies socio-economic his-
tory. Additionaly, our results are consistent with the study of
political ideology, which shows that people support authoritar-
ianism in the presence of many individuals exposed to threats
and oppose egalitarianism as a response to inequality or power
imbalance, respectively55, because small α and β imply the
presence of vulnerable and privileged people, respectively.
Note that our results regarding the family systems and the
socio-economic structures are expected to be rather general.
The conclusion here is independent of the details of the present
model, as long as the production increases sub-linearly with
labour input, and multi-level selection between family and
society is considered. For further exploration of the relation-
ships among environmental conditions, family systems, and
social structures, a collaboration between theoretical research
and empirical area studies across the world with quantitative
indicators will be necessary.
One can also discuss long-term changes in c and ε , and their
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Fig. 6. The dependencies of the heaviness of the tails of the wealth
distribution upon environmental parameters and family systems. a,
Heaviness of the poor tail α given by the power-law fitting wα . b,
Heaviness of the exponential tail β given by the exponential fitting
exp(−βw). Smaller α and β show the heavier tails for the poor
and rich sides, respectively. c, d, Averaged value of α (c) and β
(d) classified by the dominant family system (stem, community,
absolute nuclear, and egalitarian nuclear families) in each society,
with error bars. Values for the environmental parameters fixed to
ε = 0.0003 and c= 1.5 are plotted in black, whereas those averaged
over ε = 0.0001,0.0003,0.001,0.003 and c = 1.0,1.2,1.5,2.0 are
plotted in red.
influence on family systems. At times of cultivation, a nuclear
family evolves because of sufficient capacity. As the popu-
lation increases and capacity become limited, an extended
family would replace it. Additionally, the risks of invasion
from surrounding areas, infectious disease, and famine, and
accordingly ε would increase gradually because of the dense
population. This scenario explains the historical change of
family systems from a primitive nuclear family (which is an
intermediate form of a nuclear family and the inheritance
in which siblings temporary living together with parents af-
ter marriage and the distribution of wealth is weakly biased,
as observed in some peasant societies, hunter-gatherers, and
nomads) to a stem family and then to a community family8.
Here, environmental factors change gradually as a result
of the interaction between the society and the environment.
However, the change in environmental factors, in turn, alters
family systems and social structures. Such historical dynamics
of society were discussed by Braudel as the interaction of
historical factors on different time scales4–6.
The present model has some limitations. First, the dif-
ferentiation of people between the elites and the majority
was not considered. As society becomes stratified, people
start to rent land from the elites. This results in the diver-
gence of environmental factors and different family systems
amongst the elites and the majority, as has been ethnograph-
ically observed8. A model is needed for dealing with social
stratification and the interaction of classes to discuss broader
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Fig. 7. Phase diagram of family systems against environmental
conditions; the capacity of land resources c, and the amount of wealth
required for survival ε , associated with the period since the onset of
agriculture and geographic location, respectively. Stem, community,
absolute nuclear, and egalitarian nuclear families are plotted in green,
red, blue, and orange, respectively. Small or large c and small or
large ε are explained by the early or late onset of agriculture and
peripheral or central geographic location, respectively.
issues. Second, the present model did not consider marriage.
Marriage combines the wealth of two families to build a new
family. Such horizontal transmissions of wealth introduce
another form of interaction between families. The effect of
marriage-related interaction on social structures should be ex-
amined. Third, marriage age, external/internal marriage, and
paternal/maternal inheritance are considered to further clas-
sify family systems8 and are out of the scope of the present
model. Finally, in the modern world, peasant societies should
no longer be regarded as isolated systems, but as components
of a world-system11. A new model needs to be developed to
consider the interaction between towns and peasant societies,
as well as international, political, and commercial networks.
To summarize, we presented a multi-level evolution model
to account for the emergence of the four basic family sys-
tems depending on environmental conditions and resultant
socio-economic structures, as is consistent with family-level
studies and economic history at a society-level. In this study,
the microscopic characteristics of family systems determine
the macroscopic social structure of the distribution of wealth,
which forms the basis for the development of societies. This
study allows an explanation of the universal evolutionary con-
straint that human societies satisfy.
Methods
We adopted the following algorithm for changes in the wealth
and population of families. Families lose a proportion d of
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their wealth when the generation is altered as a result of aging
equipment, disaster, or taxation, for example. With probability
1−s, siblings leave their parents’ home before production, and
the inheritance is distributed with a wealth loss of ε . Families
produce through the labour provided by the family members.
Here, the production of wealth is inversely proportional to
the number of families in society if capacity is exceeded,
proportional to the logarithm of labour, increases with linear
feedback from wealth, and is perturbed by noise resulting from
internal and environmental fluctuations following a Gaussian
distribution. With probability s, siblings work together at their
parents’ home and build families of their own after production.
Finally, people produce offspring and the generation is altered.
The birth rate increases linearly with wealth. Here, families
reproduce without considering marriage explicitly.
For the parent family i and its jth child’s family i, j, the pop-
ulation N and the amount of wealth w at time t are expressed
as follows:
with probability 1− sti ,
Nti, j = 1 (1≤ j ≤ Nti ) (1)
wt∗i, j = (1−d) ·wt−1i · e−λ
t
i j/
Nti
∑
k=1
e−λ
t
i k− ε (2)
wti, j = w
t∗
i, j+ r · (1+η)(1+wt∗i, j) log(1+Nti, j) (3)
unless,
wt∗i = (1−d) ·wt−1i (4)
wti = w
t∗
i + r · (1+η)(1+wt∗i ) log(1+Nti ) (5)
wti, j = w
t
i · e−λ
t
i j/
Nti
∑
k=1
e−λ
t
i k− ε (1≤ j ≤ Nti ) (6)
then,
Nt+1i, j = Poisson(birth+ f ·wti, j) (7)
st+1i, j = s
t
i +ζ , λ
t
i, j = λ
t
i +ζ (8)
where,
r = min(1,capacity / # families) (9)
η ∼ N(0,σ2), ζ ∼ N(0,µ2). (10)
Following a study on preindustrial farming56, we assume
that production increases in proportion to the logarithm of
labour input, and is perturbed by Gaussian noise with a mean
of 0 and a variance of σ2, resulting from internal and environ-
mental fluctuations. Therefore, the total output of siblings is
always higher when each produces independently to form a
nuclear family than when they concentrate their labor in an
extended family (the productivities of N members are N log2
and log(N + 1), for nuclear and extended families respec-
tively). However, under a limited capacity of available land
resources, the total output of the society consisting of nu-
clear families will be lower than that of extended families
(the productivities are 1NN log2 and log(N+ 1), for nuclear
and extended families respectively). In other words, there is a
conflict between family and society level preferences for nu-
clear versus extended families under conditions of the limited
capacity.
We assumed that the mth child’s share of the inheritance
is proportional to exp(−λm). In some societies, however,
the last child inherits the most instead of the first8. If nec-
essary, the order of children could be arranged in reverse to
include such a case. Although an exponential distribution
is adopted in this study, the results described below do not
change qualitatively if a linear distribution is considered.
We carried out a multi-level evolutionary simulation using
the settings mentioned above. The initial values of strategies
are s = 0.5,λ = log2 for all families. In other words, the
family is differentiated to neither nuclear nor extended and
neither equal nor strongly biased inheritance. However, no
qualitative changes are observed under other initial conditions.
The source codes are available online. The notations and
parameter values adopted in the simulations are summarized
in Table 1.
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SUPPLEMENTARY TEXT
Deriving the gamma distribution from the stochastic process
In the wealth production of our model, we consider the linear feedback from wealth and that
from the logarithm of the labour force, as well as the multiplicative noise. Additionally, through
the decay of wealth and the division of the inheritance, the amount of wealth for each family is
saturated. Here, the growth of wealth with positive feedback and nonlinear saturation with a
multiplicative stochastic process is assumed.
The production of wealth increases with wealth w, which is generally saturated for large w.
A simple example is given for the linear growth and the nonlinear saturation as w˙ = bw− aw2,
whereas the production rate fluctuates through the noise. Therefore, the simplest example of
wealth dynamics is expressed as follows:
w˙ = −aw2 + bw+ cwη, (S1)
where η follows a normal distribution. The stationary distribution that corresponds to Eq. (S1) is
expressed as follows:
P(w) =
1
(cw)2
exp(2
∫ −aw2 + bw
(cw)2
dw) (S2)
∝
1
c2w2
exp(−2a
c2
w+
2b
c2
logw) (S3)
= w(2b−1)/c2 exp(−2a
c2
w). (S4)
This defines the gamma distribution.
Our model includes a complicated process for the distribution of wealth to siblings as well
as feedback from the labour force to wealth production, which cannot be written using simple
forms, as shown in Eq. (S1). However, one may expect linear feedback, nonlinear saturation, and
multiplicative stochasticity. Therefore, the simple model Eq. (S1) would capture the dynamics to
a certain degree.
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Fig. S1. Dependence of phase diagrams of family systems on the parameters µ, f , and d. Stem, community,
absolute nuclear, and egalitarian nuclear families are plotted in green, red, blue, and orange, respectively.
Unless the value is shown on the axis, the parameter values are fixed to those in Table 2. a, The dependence
on mutation rate µ. As µ becomes larger, regions with nuclear families shown in blue and orange are enlarged.
b, The dependence on feedback rate f . A large f accelerates wealth accumulation, which results in the
development of unequal inheritance. Additionally, a large f results in many children. Therefore, family-level
competition is intensified, and the regions of a nuclear family are enlarged. c, The dependence on the decay
rate d. A large d prevents wealth accumulation, which results in the development of equal inheritance. When
d is small, unequal inheritance develops. If it is too small, the nonlinear saturation of wealth accumulation
works only weakly so that the wealth of stem families can reach w ∼ O(1000). At that time, the feedback
from the wealth to the birth rate should be saturated in reality, and our model assuming linear feedback
would be invalid. There should be a biological upper limit to the number of offspring. For families with more
wealth, higher negative feedback terms that are not considered here should keep the fertility rate constant.
Therefore, this model is only valid for w ∼ O(10). As long as d ≥ 0.4, the nonlinear saturation works to keep
w ∼ O(10) and the phase diagrams are qualitatively robust.
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